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Kwass: Assignment--Implied Warranty by Assignor of Solvency of Obligator
STUDENT NOTES
STUDENT NOTES
ASSIGNM-ENT-IM14PLIED

WARRANTY

BY

ASSIGNOR

OF

SOLVENCY

op OBLIGOR.- The American Law Institute in its RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS lays down the rule that "an assignor does
not by the mere fact of assigning warrant that the obligor is
solvent or that he will perform his obligation."'
Mr. Samuel
Williston, the reporter for contracts, limits his explanatory comments to: "Subsection (2) states well-settled law; 2 and in his
comprehensive treatise on the LAw OF CONTRACTS, cites only
authorities in support of the stand taken by the RESTATEMENT,
though he there recognizes another view.'
The cases, however, do not indicate that this is true, but that
there is a conflict of authority upon the problem, one view being
in accord with the rule as laid down above, and the other contra
thereto.!
There being a split of authority upon the matter, it is
not the purpose of this note to attempt to ascertain the better
view, but to determine which of them is accepted by the courts
of this state.
This discussion is limited to the assignment of non-negotiable
choses in action arising in contract, not in tort, and excluding
any matters dealing with negotiable instruments; this being the

manner in which the

RESTAT.ENT

rule is limited by other sections

thereof." Generally the term assignment is used to denote the transfer of such rights while, on the other hand, the term endorsement
relates to the transfer of negotiable paper.'

A construction of the provision of the

RESTATMENT

in question

here becomes important in order to determine whether or not the

I§

175, sub-section (2).
Tird, Appendix, Explanatory notes to § 175.
•1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) 851, § 445.
'See 5 C. J. 969-970 and cases there cited. Also 2 R. C. L. 626-627, whero
it is stated that when an assignment is made without recourse there is no implied warranty of solvency, but, when those words are omitted, the assignor
may be held by implication to so warrant. And see Findley v. Smith, 42 W.
Va. 299, 26 S. E. 370 (1896), in which a judgment was assigned without recourse and assignor held not to warrant solvency.
2

5§ 148, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS.

'See Monographic Note on Assignments, 9 Gratt. 429 (Va. 1852) ; also Freeman's Bank v. Ruchinan, 16 Gratt. 126 (Va. 1860); Marietta Bank v. Pindall, 2 Rand 475 (Va. 1824).
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West Virginia cases are in accord with it. Two constructions may,
reasonably, be placed upon it: (a) that from the mere fact of
assignment the assignor assumes no liability whatsoever in regard
to solvency of the obligor; (b) that from the mere fact of assignment the assignor simply does not make himself liable as a warrantor or guarantor of the obligor's solvency.
Though at this
point the distinction may seem highly technical and pedantic, after
a discussion of the West Virginia cases it will be seen that it is an
important one to make in the determination of the position of the
West Virginia courts.
In National Bank v. Spates7 the Court, speaking through Holt,
President, says, "The case of Mackie v. Davis8 was decided in
1796, and has been a leading case in Virginia and in this state
on the general doctrine of assignment of non-negotiable instruments, and the general doctrine there discussed has from that day
to this been followed, expanded, and applied in many cases."
The question involved in Mackie v. Davis' was, "Can the assignee of a bond maintain an action against the assignor without
a special undertaking by the latter to insure payment?"
The
Court there held that there was such a right based upon common
law principles, analagous to the implied warranties in the sale of
chattels; and the Court stated that there was no reason for any
differentiation between the two cases; i. e., sale of chattels and
assignment of non-negotiable bonds.
The first case in West Virginia on this problem, Nichol's Executor v. Porter," is quite complicated, but for our purposes it need
only be noted that the defendants assigned, in West Virginia, a
note made in St. Louis and there negotiable but, as the assignment
created a new contract, it had the status of a non-negotiable instrument here. The Court held the defendants not liable because,

7 41 W. Va. 27, 30, 23 S. E. 666, 56 Am. St. Rep. 828 (1895).
1 2 Wash. 219 (Va. 1796).
'Ibid, at p. 231. An action brought by an assignee against his assignor
to procure compensation upon failure of the obligor to meet his obligation
on the bond assigned, the bond being non-negotiable.
" 2 W. Va. 13 (1867).
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"to make the assignor of such a note liable for its payment,
it is well settled that the maker must be shown to be insolvent at the time the note falls due; or that due diligence has
been used against the maker without making the money, or
by the use of due diligence, the money could not be made.""
In Morrison et al. v. Lovel' 2 a certificate of deposit executed by
a bank within the confederate lines was thereby rendered void.
However, it was assigned by defendants to plaintiff within the
Federal lines which, the Court held, constituted a new contract,
and stated :'
"As a general rule, the assignee cannot recover from the
assignor the amount paid for the assignment, unless due diligence is used, without effect, against the debtor; but it is
in no case necessary to pursue the debtor, if it be clear that
such pursuit would be unavailing; as if the obligor be insolvent' at the time of the assignment; or when the note falls due;
or where the note is a forgery; or where the maker is a married
woman. "'
Slifer v. Howell's Administrator' was another case growing out
of the invalid bonds issued by the confederate state of Virginia
during the Civil War. Though the case is not directly in point,
it contains the following dictum :'
"The contract of assignment of what is commonly called
"cash paper" has undergone judicial investigation, and the
obligation of the assignor is well defined and understood.
It is that he warrantsthe solvency of the debtor and the existence and justice of the debt. Upon the assignee using or exercising due diligence to collect the debt, and failing, because
of the inability of the debtor to pay, or because the debtor
shows that he ought not, in law, to be required to pay the
same, and thus defeats recovery; then the law raises an implied promise, on the part of the assignor, to repay the price
which he received for it."
"Ibid, at p. 2 1 .
'4 W. Va. 346 (1870).
lIbid, at p. 350.
Italics in the opinion quoted here, and subsequently, are ours.
'!'Citing Mackie v. Davis, supra n. 8.
119 W. Va. 391 (1876).
"'Ibid,at p. 397; citing Mackie v. Davis, supra n. 8 and Caton v. Lenox,
5 Rand. 31 (Va. ]827).
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In IValker v. Henry the Court permitted a recovery, holding
the remote assignee entitled to the same rights in this case as
the immediate assignee would have."9
"Now, it had long been well settled that in those actions'
the assignee does not recover against even his immediate assignor by force of the assignment, but by force alone of the
convmton law principle of tMe action for mioney had and received. "'
Thomas v. Linn,' though badly involved and disputed upon its
facts, is clearly a case of the assignment of a non-negotiable instrument, and the .Court declares:'
"In the absence of an express agreement to the. contrary,
the assignment of a bond or non-negotiable note imports a
guarantee that the assignee shall receive the fuli amount of
the bond or note assigned, if he fails to collect the same after
exercise of due diligence."
Nevertheless, and in spite of this language, the Court limits the
amount of recovery to that amount paid for the thing assigned.'
Merchant's National Bank v. Spates' was concerned with the
assignment by defendant of a county order, invalid because improperly made. The Court held that the assignment was, in itself,
a new contract which would support the warranties of the assignor, despite the fact that the instrument was invalid. It further
held:
"The assignor warrants by implication, unless it is otherwise agreed, that it is a valid and subsisting debt, and that
the maker of the instriment -is solvent, or will be when the
claim falls due.' ' :°
Here A was the maker of a promis1936 W. Va. 100, 14 S. E. 440 (1892).
sory note and B the holder; B assigned the note to C who sued and recovered

judgment against A in the amount of the note. C assigned the judgment to
D whose execution thereon was returned "no property found".
brought suit against B.
' See W. VA. CODE ANN. (Barnes, 1923) C. 99, § 15.
The reference is to actions by assignees against assignors.
u Supra n. 18, at p. 110, citing Mackie v. Davis, supra n. 8.
40 W. Va. 122, 20 S. E. 878 (1894).
"Ibid, syllabus point 3, and at p. 128.
lIbid, syllabus point 4.
Supra. n. 7, at p. 32.
SIbid, at p. 30.
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In Goff v. Miller"; the Court held that the assignee of a note not
negotiable can only recover from a remote assignor the consideration paid such assignor for the note by his immediate assignee.'
"In an action brought by an assignee against his assignor
he is entitled to recover, not on the ground of the assignment,
for the transferror of the bond is equally liable by the sale of
the bond, even without assignment, but on the principle of
natural justice that if a man buys of another that which afterwards turns out to have been worthless, he is bound to refund the price. The consideration having failed, he must pay
back the money. Hence the assignor is never liable for more
than, the price the assignee gave for the bond, with interest,
and the costs sustained in prosecuting the obligor.
Hence,
too, the assignee who sues the remote assignor can recover from
him only so much as he has received from his immediate as-

signee."2
Still, in Teter v. Moore" the Court makes this statement, though
it is clearly dictum:
"It is assignor and they are its assignees, and an assignor
guarantees that the assignee shall receive the full amount of
the bond or note assigned, if he fails to collect the same by
the exercise of due diligence."
And the Court cites Thomas v. Linn and Mackie v. Davis" as
authority.
From this review of the West Virginia cases it seems clear that
if the RESTATMENT rule is construed as meaning that the assignor,
from the mere fact of assignment incurs no liability whatsoever
with regard to the solvency of the obligor, the West Virginia cases
are contra to that view. If, on the other hand, the rule is construed
as meaning that, from the mere fact of assignment, the assignor
-41 W. Va. 683, 24. S. E. 643, 56 Am. St. Rep. 889 (1896).
Hero defendant gave a certain tract of land to A who gave the same to B. B sold it
to C,
C executing a note payable to defendant in whose name the property
remained.
Defendant, at B's request, assigned the note to B for the purpose
of showing that the land was to be deeded over.
B then assigned the note
to D who assigned it to plaintiff who, when he could not recover against C,
sought a recovery against defendant.
2IZbid, syllabus point 1.
2"Ibid, at p. 685. Accord: Trustees of Broaddus Institute v. Siers, 68 W.
Va. 125, 69 S. E. 468, Am. Ann. Cases 1912A, 920 (1910); Hughes v. Frum, 41
W. Va. 445, 23 S. E. 604 (1895).
And see Kidd v. Beckley, 64 W. Va. 80,
85, 60 S. E. 1089 (1908); Young v. Sehon, 53 W. Va. 127, 44 S. E. 136, 62
L. R. A. 499, 97 Am. St. Rep. 970 (1903).
"80 W. Va. 443, 446, 93 S. E. 342 (1917).

"Supra n. 22.
1 Supra n. 8.
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simply does not obligate himself as a strictly technical warrantor
or guarantor to the full amount of the obligation in case of the
obligor's insolvency, then the West Virginia cases are in accord.
This conclusion is based upon the fact that, though the cases
use language indicating that an assignor warrants the solvency of
the obligor, nevertheless, when a decision of the amount of liability of the assignor is actually involved, his obligation to the assignee is limited to that amount which the assignor received as
consideration for his assignment, analagously to the quasi-contractual principle of recovery upon failure of consideration.
The true rule of the Court would seem that which it actually
applies, and not those of which it merely speaks. Thus the West
Virginia cases indicate liability by the assignor to the assignee to
the amount which the assignor actually received as consideration
for the assignment in the event that the assignee failed, after expending due diligence in the attempt, to collect the obligation for
which the consideration had been paid the assignor, whether that
failure was the result of insolvency of the obligor, or of some other
cause.
Though, as was previously stated, it is not the purpose of the
writer to seek a so-called "better view", this quaere might profitably be considered: why extend an implied warranty as to solvency of the obligor in the case of an assignment of non-negotiable
instruments so as to involve greater liability than in the case of
qualified indorsements of negotiable instruments ?'

-- SwNr-Y J. KWASS.

"See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw, § 65; W. VA. CODE ANN. (Barnes,
1923) C. 98A, § 65, which is as follows: WARRANTY WHERE NEGOTIATION BY
DELIVERY OR QUALIFIED INDORSEMENT.-" Every person negotiating an instru-

ment by delivery or by a qualified indorsement warrants:
(a) That the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports
to be;
(b) That he has a good title to it;
(c) That all prior parties had capacity to contract;
(d) That he has no knowledge of any fact which would impair the validity
of the instrument or render it valueless.
But when the negotiation is by delivery only, the warranty extends in favor
of no holder other than the immediate transferee.
The provisions of sub-division (c) of this section do not apply to persons negotiating public or
corporate securities, other than bills or notes,"
It is submitted that this limitation would be properly applicable and desirable in regard to the warranty of solvency of an obligor by the assignor
in the assignment of a non-negotiable instrument. Special attention is called
to subdivision (d) which might be used as a substitute for the present rule.
See WILLISTON, CONTRACTS. Op. Cit. SIupr
n. 3, where the limitation is
suggested:
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